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Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not nec-
essarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution
concepts. The reasons for this non￿ conformity are multiple. In
this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game
theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are ra-
tional as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are
boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses,
we study behavior in repeated 2￿ person and many￿ person Beauty￿
Contest￿ Games which are strategically di⁄erent from one another.
We analyze four di⁄erent treatments and observe that convergence to-
ward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about
the other player￿ s choice and adaptation rather than self￿ initiated ra-
tional reasoning.
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11 Introduction
Nash equilibrium is the most prevalent solution concept in game theory.
However, many experiments have shown that human subjects do not neces-
sarily behave in accordance with standard equilibrium predictions. There
are many possible reasons for this. For example, a fully rational player
might ￿nd the equilibrium, however he might doubt that all players will
choose equilibrium strategies. This doubt can potentially be driven by two
considerations, (a) the doubt about other players￿rationality and (b) the
belief that other players doubt the rationality of their co￿ players.1 Or, alter-
natively, players can be boundedly rational, maybe because of computational
limits and therefore do not realize what the equilibrium behavior is. These
two interpretations can be hard to separate observationally, since equilibrium
strategies are not in general best replies to non￿ equilibrium choices of other
players.
In this paper, we report an experiment that allows us to observationally
distinguish between these two hypotheses. We focus on dominance solv-
able ￿beauty contest￿games that have been a fruitful source of experiments
concerned with assessing the bounds of human rationality.2 The results
of such experiments typically conclude that human subjects play as if they
were considering no more than a few iterated steps of reasoning. However,
the two hypotheses mentioned above are fully confounded on these data: a
player who can only think three steps ahead is observationally indistinguish-
able from a fully rational player who thinks that his opponents only think
two steps ahead.
In a Beauty￿ Contest game (BCG) n participants simultaneously choose
a number from the interval [0;100]. The winner (who receives a ￿xed prize)
is the person whose number is closest to a given proportion, say two thirds,
1Howard Rai⁄a de￿nes this as asymmetric prescriptive￿ descriptive behavior (e.g.
Rai⁄a, 1982). In order to prescribe a behavior, one needs to describe the other side￿ s
behavior. However, very often the reasoning process stops there and is asymmetric in the
sense that it does not take into account the description of one￿ s own behavior by the other
side.
2E.g., Bosch, Montalvo, Nagel and Satorra (2002), G￿th, Kocher and Sutter (2002),
Ho, Camerer and Weigelt (1998), Kocher and Sutter (2005), Nagel (1995), Nagel (1998),
Stahl (1996) and Sutter (2005). See Weber (2001) for a study of bounds on human
rationality in a di⁄erent game.
2of the average of all chosen numbers. If there is a tie, the prize is split
between those who tie. So far, BCGs have been conducted on groups from
3 to several thousands. In Grosskopf and Nagel (2007) we introduce the
two￿ person BCG.3
When n is large the theoretical solution that all choose zero can be found
by an in￿nite process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies.4
Thus a rational player who wants to play zero has to suppose that all others
also ￿nd the solution zero. The experimental evidence is that most players
do not choose zero. Therefore, zero does not always win and a choice of
a positive number can be consistent with the following two interpretations:
(1) A player realizes that zero is the equilibrium choice however doubts that
all players choose zero, and (2) a player does not realize that zero is the
equilibrium choice.
In line with the interpretation of a deviation from equilibrium by a ratio-
nal player, Bosch et al. (2002) analyze the comments by newspaper readers
who participated in a one￿ shot n > 2 BCG. They ￿nd that almost half of the
subjects who submit comments argue that zero is the equilibrium but 80%
of those do not choose it because of the expectation that some other players
are not choosing zero. However, most of these choose numbers below 10.
Similarly, Plott (1996) argues that apparently irrational outcomes of markets
could be the result of rational people expecting others to behave irrationally.
The special feature of the two￿ person BCG is that zero is a weakly domi-
nant strategy and thus is always the winning number for any choice of the
other player. Therefore, the expectation of the irrationality of others, given
as a potential explanation for the observed deviation from equilibrium of
a rational player in the n > 2 BCG, does not apply to the n = 2 case.
However, as shown in Grosskopf and Nagel (2007), students as well as more
sophisticated participants (economic researchers at conferences) choose num-
bers that are signi￿cantly greater than zero when ￿rst confronted with the
two￿ person BCG.
3Since our ￿rst collection of data on the n = 2 BCG, Costa￿ Gomes and Crawford
(2006) also conducted two￿ person BCGs. Their two￿ person games are, however, quite
di⁄erent, i.e. they are asymmetric, with di⁄erent p￿ values for di⁄erent players in the pair
and have continuous payo⁄s. Their games are dominance solvable in 3￿ 52 iterations.
4See Brandenburger and Keisler (2000) for a theoretical analysis of the ￿nitely iterated
elimination of weakly dominated strategies and its requirements.
3The aim of the current paper is to investigate what it takes for partici-
pants to learn to choose zero in the two￿ person BCG. By manipulating the
information feedback after each round we explore whether and how subjects
converge to the optimal choice of zero and under which conditions this is the
case. We are especially interested in whether subjects consciously learn to
play the equilibrium or rather arrive at it through a process of adaptation.
This analysis enables us to relate the observations to behavior in the n > 2
case and derive potential reasons behind positive choices there.
We study four treatments of a 2￿ person BCG, in which ￿xed pairs re-
peatedly interact. The treatments di⁄er by the feedback that players receive
after each round, and whether the n = 2 BCG is played before or after
the n > 2 BCG. The feedback is tailored to separate adaptation behavior
that might be triggered by observing the other player￿ s choice (e.g. through
imitation) from pure outcome based adaptation (change one￿ s choice in re-
sponse to own payo⁄ information only). The order in which the BCGs are
played is manipulated in order to investigate learning transfer. Participants
understanding the dominance argument can be separated from those who
￿learned￿to choose zero without understanding it.
We observe that if players are given very detailed feedback about choices
of their own opponent in the n = 2 BCG, the majority of them learn to play
the weakly dominant strategy. This unraveling process is much more noisy
if the amount of information is restricted to the own payo⁄. Choices do not
unravel when no feedback is given.
Most players in the full information treatment increase their choices when
switching from the n = 2 BCG to the n > 2 BCG. This is in line with an
interpretation that players doubt the rationality of others in the n > 2 case
while having (￿nally) understood the dominance argument in the n = 2 case.
However, when the BCG￿ s are played in the reverse order, no evidence to
uphold this argument can be found. Players who switch from the n > 2 BCG
to the n = 2 BCG also increase their choices, clearly violating dominance.
We conclude that players do not apply rational reasoning but are predom-
inantly boundedly rational. In particular, they do not search for dominant
or dominated strategies but rather start with focal point choices and their
best reply. The observation that the overwhelming majority chooses domi-
nated strategies in the 2￿ person game implies the predominance of bounded
4rationality in the n > 2 BCG rather than a consideration that others being
boundedly rational.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the game and its
theoretical solution in more detail and section 3 describes the experimental
design. Section 4 discusses the experimental results and section 5 concludes.
An Appendix includes a sample set of instructions.
2 The Game
In this study we focus on the BCG where the winning number is de￿ned as
the number that is closest to two thirds of the mean of the chosen numbers.
The game is repeated for several periods. The unique equilibrium in the
one￿ shot and in the repeated n = 2 BCG is that both players choose zero.
A unilateral deviation leads to a lower payo⁄, since zero is always closer to
2/3 of the average of zero and also to 2/3 of the average if the opponent
chooses any positive number. Hence, zero weakly dominates all positive
numbers. Thus, a rational player should choose zero without the need to
rely on the assumption of common knowledge of rationality.
This is the essential di⁄erence between the n = 2 and the n > 2 person
BCG. In the n > 2 BCG a rational player should delete all weakly dominated
strategies (numbers greater 2=3 ￿ 100). However, further deletion relies upon
his knowledge or belief of the other players￿rationality and their beliefs of
other players, hence zero as the unique best response relies on the common
knowledge of rationality.
3 Experimental Design
All experiments were conducted in the experimental laboratory (LEEX) of
the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. Since the BCG is sometimes
used as a teaching tool in undergraduate economics, we carefully selected
participants and made sure they were not previously exposed to the BCG.
We only allowed freshmen to participate and solicited students from di⁄erent
campuses for di⁄erent sessions. The experiments were conducted during
April, September, October 2000, October 2004 and June 2005 using ￿rst
year undergraduate students majoring in either economics, political science,
5law, medicine or humanities with no formal training in game theory at the
University Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona.5
In an experimental session we had either ten, sixteen or eighteen stu-
dents. Participants were ￿rst randomly matched into pairs in three of the
four treatments. The n = 2 BCG was repeated 10 times in a ￿xed pair
setting, followed by 4 rounds of the n > 2 BCG.6 In a fourth treatment
we reversed the order, i.e. ￿rst four rounds of the n > 2 BCG were played
followed by 10 rounds of the n = 2 BCG.7 The treatments further di⁄ered
according to the information (feedback after each round) that was provided.
Table I summarizes the experimental design.
n = 2 =) n > 2
Full Info 2 sessions (18 + 16)
Partial Info 3 sessions (2 ￿ 18 + 10)
No Info 3 sessions (2 ￿ 18 + 16)
n > 2 =) n = 2
Reverse Full Info 2 sessions (2 ￿ 18)
Table I: Summary of treatments
(number of participants given in parentheses)
Full Info Treatment: In the Full Info treatment all players were informed
about the other player￿ s choice in the pair (n = 2) or all other players￿choices
in the group (n > 2). The experimenter wrote those choices as well as 2=3
of the mean and the obtained payo⁄ either on the decision sheet in the case
5All sessions run in 2005 only used non econ students and were computerized using
zTree (Fischbacher, 1999).
6The exact size of n was equal to the respective session size, i.e. 10, 16 or 18.
7A translated set of instructions is available in the Appendix. In the set of instructions
for the computerized experiments we included ￿The winner will be determined as follows:
First, the average number of both participants￿choices (including yours) will be computed.
This average will be computed by adding up the numbers chosen by both participants in
a pair and dividing by two. A target number will then be determined by multiplying
the average of a pair￿ s choices by two￿ thirds. Thus: target number = 2/3 x (average of
everyone￿ s choices in a pair). The person who chose closest to this target number will be
the winner. In case of a tie, the prize is split amongst the winners.￿
6of n = 2 or on the board in front of the room in the case of n > 2 after each
round.8
Partial Info Treatment: After each round, participants in the Partial
Info treatment were only informed whether they had won the ￿xed prize or
not.9 Learning through the choice of the other was therefore excluded by
design.
These ￿rst two treatments were chosen to separate adaptation behavior
triggered by observing the other player￿ s choice from adaptation behavior in
response to an observed win or loss outcome. The third treatment was de-
signed to investigate whether behavior changes only in response to outcomes
or in response to the mere repetition of the task. We therefore omitted all
feedback in the third treatment, similar to Weber (2003).
No Info Treatment: Participants did not receive any feedback in the
No Info treatment. The experimenters recorded each participant￿ s choice,
calculated the average and target number and determined the winner. Par-
ticipants were informed that the experimenters had done this (but were not
told the results) and were then asked to make a choice for the next period.
Only at the conclusion of both parts of the experiment were subjects in-
formed whether they had obtained the ￿xed prize in any given period (or
parts of it).
In order to better understand transfer behavior between the 2￿ person
and many￿ person BCG and to compare ￿rst round behavior in the 2￿ person
BCG with the many￿ person BCG when both are played ￿rst, we conducted
a fourth treatment where we reversed the order of the BCG￿ s.
8In the computerized session this information was provided on the individual computer
screens.
9In case of a tie, winning subjects split the ￿xed prize and were informed about the
amount they obtained.
7Reverse Full Info: In the Reverse Full Info, participants ￿rst played four
rounds of the n > 2 BCG followed by ten rounds of the n = 2 BCG. We
gave subjects the same information as in the Full Info treatment.
The ￿xed prize in each round was equal to 100 pesetas (at the time
roughly $0.64) in the n = 2 BCG.10 We paid the winner of each round 1,000
pesetas in the n > 2 BCG. In the later experiments, conducted after the
introduction of the Euro, we paid a 1 Euro prize (at that time about $1.20)
in the n = 2 BCG and 10 Euros in the n > 2 BCG. Subjects were paid their
accumulated earnings at the end of the experiment. Average earnings were
about 1,250 pesetas (at that time about $8), including a 500 peseta show￿ up
fee. In the later sessions the average earnings were 11.20 Euros (at that
time about $13.44), including a 4 Euro show￿ up fee. Sessions lasted about
60 minutes with the computerized ones being shorter.
In all treatments we asked participants to explain their choice.11 While
we know little how this might actually a⁄ect the choice itself, we hoped
that such an e⁄ect would not interact with any potential treatment e⁄ects.
We asked for explanations in order to gain some inside into the reasoning
process.
4 Experimental Results
4.1 First Round Behavior
Figure 1 shows the cumulative frequencies of choices in the ￿rst round of all
four treatments. We ￿nd that the distributions of ￿rst round choices in the
three treatments where the n = 2 BCG was played ￿rst are not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from each other (Kruskal￿ Wallis test statistic: ￿2=3.546, dof=2,
p = 0:1698). Only 9.85% (13 out of 132) of the participants choose zero
in the ￿rst round. Thus, roughly 90% play dominated strategies, which is
probably the highest amount ever observed in an experimental game. 21.21%
(28 out of 132) of the chosen numbers are above 50.
10While the 100 pesetas may seem like a small amount in $￿ equivalents it would buy a
delicious cafØ con leche (lattØ) in the cafeteria of Pompeu Fabra.
11Participants were asked to provide handwritten explanations in both, the hand￿ run
as well as the computerized, sessions.
8Surprisingly, initial choices in the Reverse Full Info treatment ￿where
participants ￿rst played 4 rounds of the n > 2 BCG followed by 10 rounds
of the n = 2 BCG ￿are not stochastically di⁄erent from those in the n = 2
BCG (i.e. round 1, Reverse Full Info versus round 1, Full Info) (Kolmogorov￿
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Figure 1: Cumulative Frequencies of First Round Choices
4.2 Behavior over Time (n = 2)
Figure 2 plots the median choice over all pairs for each treatment over time.12
Figure 3 shows individual choices. In the Full Info treatment choices clearly
unravel to the equilibrium (Spearman correlation coe¢ cient for the aggregate
data is -0.98, p < 0:001). 76.5% (13/17) of the pairs have a signi￿cant neg-
ative correlation coe¢ cient. In round 10 we observe 73.5% (25/34) choices
to be equal to zero.
12We have chosen the median instead of the mean since we believe it to be more de-
scriptive of the distribution of choices.
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Figure 3: Dotplots of Individual Choices
(x￿axes refer to rounds and y￿axes plot the distribution of choices)
10In the Partial Info treatment, the unraveling to equilibrium is much slower
(Spearman correlation coe¢ cient for the aggregate data is -0.87, p < 0:01).
Only 21.7% (5/23) of all pairs have a signi￿cantly negative coe¢ cient. This
proportion is signi￿cantly less than in the Full Info treatment (Test of equality
of proportions, z = 3:34, p < 0:05).13 In round 10 we observe 26.1% (12/46)
choices to be equal to zero compared to 73.5% in the Full Info treatment.
This di⁄erence in proportions is signi￿cant (Test of equality of proportions,
z = 4:21, p < 0:001).
Finally, there is no signi￿cant decrease to zero in the No Info treat-
ment (Spearman correlation coe¢ cient for the aggregate data is 0.0027,
p = 0:9416).14 Only 7.7% (2/26) of all pairs have a signi￿cant negative
coe¢ cient, and 3.9% (1/26) are even signi￿cantly positive. However, there
is only a marginal di⁄erence between the Partial and No Info treatments
(Test of equality of proportions, Partial vs. No Info: z = 1:47, p = 0:0708).
In round 10 we observe 25.0% (13/52) choices to be equal to zero compared
to 26.1% in the Partial Info treatment. These proportions are not signi￿-
cantly di⁄erent from one another (Test of equality of proportions, z = 0:12,
n:s:).
How can the low tendency to play the equilibrium and the rather slow
convergence or non￿ convergence be explained? The analysis shown in Table
II is an attempt to determine the driving forces behind the observed behavior.
We analyze the sequential dependencies in the data by looking at individual
behavior from one round to the next. We count the number of observations
with increased, unchanged and decreased choices. We do this separately for
winners and losers. For winners we distinguish between those who chose
zero and those chose a number other than zero. Losers who decrease their
choices are further divided into di⁄erent categories depending on whether
13The speci￿c test statistic is z = (p1 ￿ p2)=Spc, where pi is the proportion of
pairs with a signi￿cant negative correlation coe¢ cient in subsample i, and Spc = q
pc(1 ￿ pc)( 1
N1 + 1
N2) is an estimate of the standard error of the di⁄erence in propor-
tions, p1￿p2. pc is an estimate of the population proportion under the null hypothesis of
equal proportions, pc = (p1N1 + p2N2)=(N1 + N2), where Ni is the total number of pairs
in subsample i (see Glasnapp and Poggio, 1985).
14Note that this is di⁄erent from the results obtained by Weber (2003). Weber (2003)
￿nds unraveling in n > 2 BCGs when no feedback is provided between rounds.
11the opponent￿ s choice of the previous period was not quite reached, imitated,
undercut with a choice above zero or whether zero was directly chosen.
Full Info15 Partial Info16 No Info17
# Losers (L) 124 196 232
# L % 18.6% ( 23
124) 39.3% ( 77
196) 33.6% ( 78
232)
# L = 6.5% ( 8
124) 7.1% ( 14
196) 16.0% ( 37
232)
# L &￿ 75.0% ( 93
124) 53.6% ( 105
196) 50.4% ( 117
232)
> othera 38.7% ( 48
124) 33.2% ( 65
196) 34.9% ( 81
232)
= other & 6= 0 0.8% ( 1
124) 1.0% ( 2
196) 0.4% ( 1
232)
= other & = 0 9.7% ( 12
124) 2.0% ( 4
196) 1.3% ( 3
232)
< other & > 0 21.0% ( 26
124) 15.8% ( 31
196) 12.1% ( 28
232)
< other & = 0 4.8% ( 6
124) 1.5% ( 3
196) 1.7% ( 4
232)
# Winners (W) > 0 68 122 139
# W %￿￿ 22.1% ( 15
68) 45.9% ( 56
122) 49.6% ( 69
139)
> other 7.4% ( 5
68) 12.3% ( 15
122) 19.4% ( 27
139)
= other 1.5% ( 1
68) 1.6% ( 2
122) 0.7% ( 1
139)
< other 13.2% ( 9
68) 32.0% ( 39
122) 29.5% ( 41
139)
# W = 11.8% ( 8
68) 18.9% ( 23
122) 7.9% ( 11
139)
# W & 66.2% ( 45
68) 35.3% ( 43
122) 42.4% ( 59
139)
> 0 47.1% ( 32
68) 30.3% ( 37
122) 33.1% ( 46
139)
= 0 19.1% ( 13
68) 4.9% ( 6
122) 9.4% ( 13
139)
# Winners (W) = 0 56 74 93
# W %￿￿ 10.7% ( 6
56) 5.4% ( 4
74) 15.1% ( 14
93)
> other 7.1% ( 4
56) 2.7% ( 2
74) 5.4% ( 5
93)
= other 0% ( 0
56) 0% ( 0
74) 0% ( 0
93)
< other 3.6% ( 2
56) 2.7% ( 2
74) 9.7% ( 9
93)
# W = 89.3% ( 50
56) 94.6% ( 70
74) 84.9% ( 79
93)
a￿other￿refers to the choice of the other throughout
￿ frequencies below specify di⁄erent categories of decreases
￿￿ frequencies below specify di⁄erent categories of increases
Table II: Sequential Dependencies
15Out of 153 pairs analyzed, 29 (18.95%) tied, with 26 ties at zero (89.66%).
16Out of 207 pairs analyzed, 11 (5.31%) tied, with 7 ties at zero (63.64%).
17Out of 236 pairs analyzed, 2 (0.85%) tied, with one tie at zero (50%) and one at 50.
12We do a similar analysis for winners who increase their choices. For
winners who won with a number other than zero we also distinguish be-
tween those who decrease their choice to a number above zero and those who
choose zero. The modal frequencies within each group in a treatment are in
bold. The percentages of losers and winners choosing zero (i.e., playing the
equilibrium) after a choice above zero are emphasized.
The highest frequency of change is observed when losers receive full infor-
mation: 75% decrease their choices. Fewer losers in the other two treatments
decrease their choices (53.6% in Partial Info and 50.4% in No Info). Note
that while participants in the No Info treatment did not know whether they
lost or won, we included this information for comparability with the other
treatments. Losers in the Partial Info, therefore, do not seem to react to
the information of a loss since their behavior is similar to the behavior of
￿losers￿in the No Info treatment.
Learning to play the equilibrium, however, is di¢ cult even in the Full Info
treatment. Only 14.6% (out of the 75%) of the losers who lower their choice
decrease it to zero (9.7%, who imitate the winner, plus 4.8%, who undercut
the winner). The corresponding percentages in the other two treatments are
3.5% out of 53.6% (Partial Info) and 3% out of 50.4% (No Info). More than
1/3 of the losers do not lower their choices below the choice of the winning
partner in all treatments.
Choosing zero seems equally di¢ cult for winners who have not chosen
zero. Only 19.1% of the 66.2% decreasing winners chose zero in the next
round in the Full Info treatment. In the other two treatments the correspond-
ing frequencies are much lower, 4.9% and 9.4%. However, once winners reach
the equilibrium, they choose it again with high probability in all treatments
(89.3%, 94.6%, and 84.9% in Full Info, Partial Info and No Info respectively,
see last row of Table II).
Imitation of the winning number is fairly low in the Full Info treatment
(0.8% + 9.7% = 10.5%) as compared to the frequency of players understand-
ing that a number below the number of the winner should be chosen (21%
+ 4.8% = 25.8%). However, it is obviously much higher than in the Partial
Info treatment (3%) and the No Info treatment (1.7%).
Players who imitate a winning choice greater than zero could be inter-
preted as ￿na￿ve￿players. Losers who undercut the winner but do not yet
13choose zero could be thought of as level 1 players (see Nagel, 1995; Stahl,
1996 and Ho et al., 1998 for a classi￿cation of players according to their
levels of reasoning). Players who are playing zero by undercutting winners
are very high level players or so￿ called equilibrium players. Those who stay
unchanged or even increase have no understanding of the game.
Another evidence that players who undercut the winner with a choice of
zero are more ￿sophisticated￿(i.e., exhibit higher levels of reasoning) can
be found in the observation that all of the 6 observations in the Full Info
treatment come from 6 players who chose zero in all of the subsequent rounds.
The 12 observations of imitating choice of zero come from 8 individuals, 5 of
which chose zero always after and 3 kept going up and down, again sometimes
imitating the winner.
Taking all these observations together, we see that the majority of losers
and winners decrease their choices in the Full Info treatment. This is not
the case in the Partial and No Info treatments. While roughly half of the
losers do decrease their choices, winners predominantly increase their choices
in those treatments. There is also a big di⁄erence across treatments as to
by how much decreasing losers and winners lower their choices. A combined
22.5% (31/138) of the decreasing losers and winners in the Full Info treatment
choose zero. This happens less in the Partial Info (8.8%, 13/148) and the
No Info (11.4%, 20/176) treatments. The additional information in the Full
Info treatments allows for imitative behavior but also seems to induce higher
levels of reasoning.
However, since it takes 7 rounds for the median choice to be zero in the
Full Info treatment (the only treatment where we ￿nd clear convergence) we
conclude that choices unravel to equilibrium through an adaptive learning
process that is triggered by observing the other player￿ s choice rather than
by rational reasoning. Observed behavior of two sample pairs (shown in
Figure 4) supports and illustrates this claim. Panel (A) shows a pair that
slowly and parallel adjusts to equilibrium. In round 9 both happened to
choose 1 and tied. In round 10, player 1 writes, ￿I choose 1 again because
the other also did this last time and we tied. He will do the same again.￿
However, player 2￿ s argument in round 10 is ￿Since the other is doing what
I do, we will both choose zero now.￿ Player 4 in panel (B) of Figure 4
understands the game in round 7 and writes ￿It is always the lower number
14that wins and zero is the lowest possible.￿However, his counterpart does not
understand the situation fully. He writes in round 10 ￿Well, since the other
always won with zero, I want to see whether I also win by choosing zero.￿
Figure 5 shows behavior of two sample pairs in the Partial Info treatment.
Lacking information about the other player￿ s choice, participants￿adaptation
towards equilibrium is impeded. In panel (A) player 1 understood the game
by round 2, player 2￿ s comment about his round 10 choice is that ￿I choose
17 because it was a very special day for me on a personal level.￿Player 4 in
panel (B) of Figure 5 won in round 9 by choosing 8 and writes in round 10
(where he also chooses 8) ￿I just do the same again, since I was successful in
the last round.￿His counterpart chooses 5 in round 10 and says ￿I just try
a low number.￿
Figure 6 gives a ￿ avor of the ￿clueless￿behavior in the No Info treatment.
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Figure 6: Choices of two sample pairs in the No Info treatment
4.3 Behavior over Time (n > 2)
In all treatments where the n = 2 BCG is played before the n > 2 BCG
we observe no signi￿cant decrease over time in the n > 2 BCG (see Figure
2). This is unusual compared to behavior normally observed in other BCG
games.18 Players seem to think that they are starting too low after having
played the n = 2 BCG and adjust their choices upwards. We speculate that
this initial ￿overreaction￿would go away over time. We would expect to see
choices unravel if the n > 2 BCG had been played longer.
18Spearman correlation coe¢ cients are negative in the Full Info, and positive in the
Partial and No Info treatments. However, none are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
164.4 Transfer Behavior: Change from n = 2 to n > 2
In the Full and Partial Info treatments choices increase signi￿cantly when
players switch from playing the n = 2 BCG to the n > 2 BCG (Sign test of
means of matched pairs, Full Info: p = 0:0001 and Partial Info: p = 0:0392).
However, choices do not di⁄er in the two BCGs in the No Info treatment (Sign
test of means of matched pairs, No Info: p = 0:4225). This suggests that
while players in both information treatments realize that there is a di⁄erence
between the two versions of the BCG, players in the No Info treatment treat
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Figure 7: Transition Plots:
Period 10 to 11 (n = 2 ! n > 2) and Period 4 to 5 (n > 2 ! n = 2)
(x￿axes plot choices in n = 2 and y￿axes plot choices in n > 2)
We further ￿nd that the distribution of choices in the Partial Info treat-
ment in round 11 is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the distribution of choices
in the corresponding round of the Full Info treatment (Kolmogorov￿ Smirnov
test: p = 0:005). In fact, the median in the Partial Info treatment is sig-
ni￿cantly higher than in the Full Info treatment (Robust rank order test,
17￿ U=-4.37, p < 0:01). Surprisingly, no di⁄erence is found between choices
in the Partial Info and the No Info treatment (Kolmogorov￿ Smirnov test:
p = 0:256).19
The above mentioned observations can be seen in three of the panels of
Figure 7 (Full Info, Partial Info and No Info) where an individual￿ s choice
in the last round of n = 2 is plotted against the same individual￿ s choice
in the ￿rst round of n > 2. So far, the evidence seems to suggest that
players can learn to di⁄erentiate between the di⁄erent BCGs when given
appropriate feedback. The question remains whether they really understand
the dominance argument? To address that question, we analyze whether
it matters which BCG is played ￿rst. If players understand the di⁄erence
between the two BCGs and in particular dominance, we should see no order
e⁄ects. However, looking at the fourth panel of Figure 7 (Reverse Full
Info) reveals almost a mirror image of the behavior observed in the Full Info
treatment suggesting a strong order e⁄ect which we shall now analyze further.
4.5 Order E⁄ects
Figure 8 plots the median of choices in the Reverse Full Info treatment where
participants ￿rst played 4 rounds of the n > 2 BCG followed by 10 rounds
of the n = 2 BCG. Figure 9 illustrates the distribution of individual choices
and demonstrates clear unraveling in both parts of this treatment (Spearman
correlation coe¢ cient is -0.6473, p < 0:0001 for rounds 1 - 4 and -0.5266,
p < 0:0001 for rounds 5 - 14).
19On an individual level we ￿nd that no choices are above 50 in round 11 in the Full Info
treatment, while there were 6.52% (3 out of 46) such choices in the Partial Info treatment
and even 21.15% (11 out of 52) in the No Info treatment.
18Figure 8: Median choices in the Reverse Full Info treatment
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Figure 9: Dotplot of choices in the Reverse Full Info treatment
(x￿axes refer to rounds and y￿axes plot the distribution of choices)
While data from the Full Info treatment seem to suggest that most players
understand dominance by round 10 (i.e. choose higher numbers in n > 2 in
round 11 than they do in the n = 2 BCG in round 10), data from the
Reverse Full Info treatment contradicts this because most players choose
higher numbers in the n = 2 BCG in round 5 than they do in the n > 2
BCG in round 4 (see Figure 10; Sign test, p = 0:0083). There is clearly a
di⁄erent kind of learning transfer going on in both treatments.
19In both treatments (Full Info as well as Reverse Full Info) choices are in-
creased when the ￿new￿BCG starts. The increase in the Full Info treatment
can therefore not be attributed to the understanding of dominance and the
mere doubt that others are rational. It looks more like a general ￿restart￿
e⁄ect that occurs independently of the order.20
Not surprisingly, comparing the ￿rst round of the n > 2 BCG when it
is played ￿rst (i.e., round 1, Reverse Full Info) with the ￿rst round of the
n > 2 BCG when it is played after the n = 2 BCG (i.e. round 11, Full Info)
we ￿nd that the distribution of means of pairs in the Full Info treatment
is signi￿cantly lower than in the Reverse Full Info treatment (Kolmogorov￿
Smirnov test: p < 0:0001).21 Similarly, we ￿nd that choices in the n = 2
BCG when it is played after the n > 2 BCG are lower than when it is played
without any prior experience (Kolmogorov￿ Smirnov test: p = 0:015).
Another interesting observation from the Reverse Full Info treatment is
that the unraveling in the n = 2 BCG is quicker when it is played after the
n > 2 BCG. Here the median of choices is equal to zero starting from the
￿fth round, compared to round 8 in the Full Info treatment when n = 2 BCG
is played ￿rst. As mentioned before, we do not ￿nd any unraveling in the
n > 2 BCG when it is played after the n = 2 BCG and clear unraveling when
it is played before the n = 2 BCG.
5 Discussion
In all versions of the BCG that have been conducted (in this paper and
elsewhere in the literature) we have seen that the majority of players do not
choose the equilibrium zero in the very ￿rst period. However, players can
￿learn￿to choose zero. The convergence in n > 2 BCGs has been found to
20We do, however, observe 16.7% (6/36) of the players in the Reverse Full Info treatment
to change from a choice greater than zero in the n > 2 BCG to zero in the n = 2 BCG.
Similarly, we observe 23.5% (8/34) of the players in the Full Info treatment to change from
zero in the n = 2 BCG to a choice greater than zero in the n > 2 BCG. This is consistent
with being rational but doubting that others are rational.
21For independence reasons we can only use means of pairs in the case when the n > 2
is played after the n = 2 case. We therefore also calculate means of pairs in the Reverse
Full Info treatment, although pairs have not yet been assigned. We use the pairing that is
used in the n = 2 segment of the Reverse Full Info treatment. Results do not change if we
use all 17 sets of 9 independent pairs that are possible from each set of 18 observations.
20depend on the in￿ uence a single player has on the result, i.e. whether or not
(s)he can ￿screw up￿the outcome.22 Behavior in the median game (Du⁄y
and Nagel, 1997) converges fastest to equilibrium. The small group (Ho et
al., 1998) and the maximum game (Du⁄y and Nagel, 1997) have the slowest
convergence.
In our 2￿ person BCG, a single player has the greatest in￿ uence on the
result and can even win the game for sure. We therefore expect behavior
to converge to the equilibrium. We observe this to be the case, however,
the type of information feedback heavily in￿ uences the speed of convergence
(see Full versus Partial Info). Without the appropriate feedback, very little
convergence can be observed (see No Info).
Even though observed behavior in the Full Info treatment unravels quickly,
this is mainly driven by the fact that at least one player in a pair ￿nds the
right solution that is then imitated. In case of the absence of a rational
player, players typically adapt slowly, choosing lower and lower numbers.
Our experimental results suggest that most players do not ￿nd the rational
solution by rational reasoning but rather by adaptation. In this process a
loser (somebody who has chosen the bigger number in the pair) easily un-
derstands that he has to decrease his choice. When information about the
other player￿ s choice is given, higher levels of reasoning are triggered and
losers tend to lower their choices below the other￿ s choice. However, when
information about winning or losing is not given, a large number of players
do not adapt to the game theoretic solution.
We conclude that the persistence of choices above zero in the 2￿ person
game implies the predominance of bounded rationality in an n￿ person game
rather than a consideration that others are boundedly rational. We have seen
that the adaptation process is heavily in￿ uenced by the type of feedback that
is given to participants after each round. Kenneth J. Arrow already pointed
out that: ￿Information may be supplied socially, but to be used, it has to
be absorbed individually. The limits on the ability to acquire information
are a major barrier to it￿ s di⁄usion. This line of argument leads to Herbert
Simon￿ s concept of bounded rationality as a process in time (p.8, 1994).￿
22It also has been shown that groups converge faster than individuals, e.g. Kocher and
Sutter (2005) and Sutter (2005).
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23Appendix ￿Instructions
You are participating in an experiment on decision making.23 If you follow the
instructions and apply them carefully, you can earn some money additionally
to the 500 Pesetas [4 Euros] which we will give you in any case. From now
on you are not allowed to talk to any participant in the experiment.
If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of the instructors will
attend you. Please, do not speak out aloud. Thank you.
Rules [n = 2]
Today￿ s experimental session consists of 2 parts. The ￿rst part will last
for 10 rounds. At the beginning, we will randomly assign you into pairs of
2 participants. These assignments will stay constant over all 10 rounds of
the ￿rst experiment, but none of you will know with whom you are paired.
[Instructions for the second part were only distributed after the ￿rst part was
￿nished.]
Rules [n > 2]
This part consists of 4 rounds. All participants belong to the same group.
The group is the same for all 4 rounds.
Decisions [n = 2]
Each participant has to choose a number between 0 and 100 that can be dec-
imal (including the extrema). The ￿winner￿of each pair will be the person
who selects a number that is closest to 2=3 of the mean of the numbers cho-
sen in that pair. [Additional sentences in all experimental sessions conducted
in 2004 and 2005: The winner will be determined as follows: First, the av-
erage number of both participants￿choices will be computed. This average
will be computed by adding up the numbers chosen by both participants in
a pair and dividing by two. A target number will then be determined by
multiplying the average of a pair￿ s choices by two￿ thirds.]
23Comments that were not necessarily in the instructions or parts of a di⁄erent treatment
are given in []. Original instructions were in Spanish.
24Decisions [n > 2]
Each participant has to choose a number between 0 and 100 that can be dec-
imal (including the extrema). The ￿winner￿of the group will be the person
who selects a number that is closest to 2=3 of the mean of all numbers chosen
in the group. [Additional sentences in all experimental sessions conducted
in 2004 and 2005: The winner will be determined as follows: First, the av-
erage number of all participants￿choices will be computed. This average
will be computed by adding up the numbers chosen by all participants in the
group and dividing by the number of people in the group. A target number
will then be determined by multiplying the average of a pair￿ s choices by
two￿ thirds.]
Payments in Points
The winner of each pair receives 100 points. In case of a tie, the points are
divided between the winners, that is each receives 50 points.
The winner of the entire group will receive 1000 points. In case of a tie,
the points are split amongst those who tie.
Payments in Pesetas [Euros]
All points accumulated during the experiment will be converted into pesetas
at the following exchange rate: 1 point is equal to 1 pta. [0.01 Euro], that is
if you have accumulated 100 points, you will be paid 100 ptas [1 Euro].
Information after each Round
[Info] After each round we will inform each participant about the points
(s)he has gained, the number chosen by the other person and 2=3 of the
mean [the other participants￿choices in n > 2].
[Partial Info] After each round we will inform each participant about
the points (s)he has gained.
[No Info] There will be no information after each round. At the end of
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